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I Abstract 
The decentralisation and globalisation of regulation has opened up new kinds of regulatory 
activities to new kinds of actors. Certification schemes as regulatory tools and Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as regulators are two such examples. NGOs have their 
own set of regulatory capabilities which can be utilised to address some of the difficulties 
that occur in regulating across nations. At the international level, there is a strong case to be 
made for collaborative regulation to exploit the regulatory capacities of NGOs and other 
non-state actors. Certification schemes are often collaborative, and they exploit market 
mechanisms to further social agendas. NGO regulation is not without its pitfalls, as there are 
issues with accountability and effectiveness. Certification schemes as a regulatory tool have 
their own problems, with questions about the effectiveness of the schemes, problems with 
supply and demand, and the negative impact of fragmentation. This paper illustrates the 
potential of certification schemes, but it also argues that that potential is not being realised. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-governmental organisations, international regulation, collaboration, certification 
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III Introduction 
 
In post-cold war international relations, one of the most significant developments was a 
dramatic rise in the participation of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the 
international level.1 Increasingly, scholarship is recognizing the importance of NGOs’ role in 
international regulation.2 Elements of the international regulatory environment mean that 
traditional domestic models of regulation are unable to be duplicated internationally. Instead, 
international regulatory literature emphasises the usefulness of collaborative regulation, and 
of utilising the different capabilities of different actors. In this way, different groups act as 
checks and balances on each other. NGOs have capabilities that can contribute to effective 
international regulation. These capabilities enable them to set standards via creating or being 
involved in certification schemes. NGOs can improve regulation via their participation, they 
can add legitimacy to a scheme, and being driven by values has certain benefits for the 
overall system. Certification schemes are voluntary regulations that use market forces and 
consumer pressure to change behaviour. They have increased in number in recent years, yet 
have the potential for more widespread use.  
 
In Part One of this paper, NGOs will be explained and their regulatory activities introduced; 
Part Two details the international regulatory environment and argues for collaboration 
between actors; and Part Three sets out the mechanisms of certification scheme regulation. In 
Part Four the contribution of NGOs is evaluated and in Part Five some issues with 
certification scheme regulation are raised and some potential solutions tabled.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Richard Youngs International Democracy and the West: The Roles of Governments, Civil Society, and 
Multinational Business (Oxford University Press, New York 2004) at 3. 
2 Anne Peters et al Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009) 
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IV About Non-Governmental Organisations 
A The emergence of non-governmental organisations 
For nearly a quarter of a millennium NGOs have been contributors to international politics.3 
In their initial involvement, they engaged with big ideological issues, such as slavery and the 
peace process, and this set the scene for the kinds of issues they would focus on for the next 
two centuries.4 This participation has fluctuated, however, with different levels of 
involvement in different eras. The involvement of NGOs was particularly strong in the early 
years of international society, when there was not a strict delineation between NGOs and 
international government organisations.5 For example, at the first Hague Peace Conference in 
1899, many peace societies sent representatives, and "conducted themselves as though they 
were official members of the conference".6 Charnovitz tracked these cycles, and opined that 
there is currently another period of increased involvement, with numbers of NGOs being 
particularly high.7 In the last century, there has been a sharp incline in the number of 
international NGOs, which has been much greater than the increase in the number of 
international governmental organisations.8 The number of NGOs at international conferences 
often exceeds the number of states.9 Charnovitz hypothesised that the increases and decreases 
in involvement relate to increases and decreases in the regulatory abilities of international 
government organisations. 10 Supporting this theory, the areas in which international NGOs 
are most active tend to be ones where current institutions have been particularly ineffective. 
Many international certification schemes, such as the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme 
                                                     
3 Steve Charnovitz "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance" (1997) 18 Mich J 
Int'l L 183 at 185.  
4 Charnovitz, above n 3, at 191-192. 
5 Charnovitz, above n 3, at 198. 
6 Charnovitz, above n 3, at 196. 
7 Charnovitz, above n 3, at 265. 
8 Union of International Associations (ed) Yearbook of International Organizations 2005/2006: Volume 5 (KG 
Saur, 42 edition, Munich, Germany) at 36 and 236–237.  
9 Anna-Karin Lindblom Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2005) at 519. 
10Charnovitz, above n 3, at 269. This has arguably occurred at the domestic level, with an increase in the 
regulatory participation of non-state actors being linked to the regulatory withdrawal of the state. 
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on Conflict Diamonds and the Forest Stewardship Council, were created after parties became 
disillusioned with attempts by international governmental organisations. Several factors have 
facilitated the rise in NGO international activities, such as the growth in international 
corporations, the weakening of national governments and the technological revolution.11 That 
is, there has been an increase in transnational activities generally, and an improvement in the 
communicative abilities of NGOs.12 These developments culminate into what one academic 
has called an "associational revolution" at the global level that he says is as "significant [a] 
social and political development…as the rise of the nation state".13 It is recognised that 
NGOs now have influence independent of states and other entities,14 with Amnesty 
International, for example, having more resources at its disposal than the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee.15   
 
B Defining Non-Governmental Organisations 
A significant amount of literature has been written about the NGO phenomena, in many        
fields of study. A common issue is that the term 'nongovernmental organisation' lacks a 
precise definition, when used in both the legal and the policy contexts.16 This problem is 
twofold: it encompasses a broad range of different groups; and the line around those that are 
and are not a part of the term is unclear. NGO is, as Archer notes: 17 
                                                     
11 Dara O'Rourke "Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and 
Monitoring" (2003) 31(1) Policy Studies Journal 27 and Bronwen Morgan & Karen Yeung An Introduction to 
Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) at 4.  
12 Grabosky, above n 12, at 116-117.  
13 Bridget M Hutter & Joan O'Mahony The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Regulating Business (Centre 
for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, September 2004 
discussion paper) at 4. 
14 Peter J Spiro "Accounting for NGOs" (2003) 3 Chicago Journal of International Law 161 at 162.  
15 Richard Youngs International Democracy and the West: The Roles of Governments, Civil Society, and 
Multinational Business (Oxford University Press, New York 2004) at 139.  
16 Lindblom, above n 9, at 45 and Kerstin Martens "Examining the (Non-) Status of NGOs in International Law" 
(2003) 10 Ind J Global Legal Stud 1 at 8. 
17 Kerstin Marens "Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental Organizations" (2002) 13(3) International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations 271 at 273 
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… an awkwardly negative title coined by the United Nations to describe a vast range of international 
and national citizens organizations, trade unions, voluntary associations, research institutes, public 
policy centers, private government agencies, business and trade associations, foundations, and 
charitable endeavors.  
This kind of criticism has been repeatedly raised, without resolution.18 The idea of 
implementing an international instrument that would set out a precise definition of NGO has 
been raised before, the first time as early as 1910, without gaining traction.19  Almost twenty 
years ago an academic noted that the term was “on the decline” because of the problems with 
it,20 yet the phrase has persisted.  
 
The main practical implication of the definitional problem is the risk of being over-inclusive, 
assigning it to organisations that would not be considered "real" NGOs.  An example is a 
Business-friendly International Non-Governmental Organisation or "BINGO". This kind of 
organisation is characterised as a corporate front group that presents itself to the community 
as an NGO, such as the Citizens for Sensible Control of Acid Rain, a coal and electricity 
industry front.21 These types of organisations affect the legitimacy and reputation of the 
"real" NGOs, although ascertaining what constitutes a real NGO is difficult and contentious 
in itself. Additionally, the vagueness causes problems for the formal inclusion of NGOs as 
international actors in international legal settings.22  
 
A further issue is that the split between national NGOs and international NGOs is indistinct, 
with many international NGOs being in fact national NGOs with international activities.23 
Distinguishing between the two may therefore be contingent on an assessment of their 
                                                     
18 Marens, above n 17. 
19 Kerstin Martens "Examining the (Non-) Status of NGOs in International Law" (2003) 10 Ind J Global Legal 
Stud 1 at 20. 
20 Charnovitz, above n 3, at 188 
21 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2000) at 489.  
22 Kerstin Martens "Examining the (Non-) Status of NGOs in International Law" (2003) 10 Ind J Global Legal 
Stud 1 at 8. 
23 Anna-Karin Lindblom Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2005) at 428.  
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activities. However, many NGOs, such as the Fair Trade umbrella organisation and the Forest 
Stewardship Council, have international bodies responsible for overseeing the schemes, but 
delegate to various national sub-organisations. Attempts to focus on only international or 
only national NGOs are likely to have difficulties drawing a bright line.  
 
A clear definition that puts all NGOs in the same category may not be a particularly useful 
term due to the variations in size, structure and agendas within the broad NGO group.24 
Perhaps a single definition is not necessary either: a study found that different areas of 
international law tended to create their own definitions, ones that related to the particular 
purpose of the law.25 Thus the term provides flexibility that would not be available if a 
precise definition was promulgated. In the literature, researchers often adopt a specific 
definition of "NGO" relevant to their purpose, or they use a different term, such as civil 
society organisations (CSOs) or international public interest groups (iPIGs).26 Commentators 
have conducted research into the different ways the phrase has been defined, but delving into 
this is beyond the scope of this paper.27 Suffice to say, for the purposes of this paper the 
focus will be on NGOs that participate in standard-setting through certification schemes.  
1. As Members of Civil Society 
NGOs are regularly discussed with reference to their role as a member of civil society.28 
Civil society can be defined be what it is not: anything not within the state or economic 
                                                     
24 Bridget M Hutter and Joan O'Mahony The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Regulating Business (Centre 
for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, September 2004 
discussion paper) at 3.  
25 Anna-Karin Lindblom Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2005) at 36.  
26 Bridget M Hutter & Joan O'Mahony The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Regulating Business (Centre 
for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, September 2004 
discussion paper), Charnovitz, above n 3.  
27 Marens, above n 17.  
28 Bridget M Hutter The Role of Non-State Actors in Regulation (Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science, April 2006, discussion paper 37) at 7, Kerstin Martens 
"Examining the (Non-) Status of NGOs in International Law" (2003) 10 Ind J Global Legal Stud 1 at 24, 
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sectors.29 It is a broad term and includes NGOs, charities, trusts, foundations, advocacy 
groups and non-state associations, with NGOs being probably the best known regulatory 
sources in the sector.30 Thus, the thinking on the role that civil society plays in international 
regulation is relevant to considering NGOs' role. A well-functioning and critical civil society 
is cited as a necessary precondition to a democratic state, "if not for the sake of its initial 
formation then for the sake of its coherence and stability over time".31 This concept has been 
promoted to the international level to some extent, with the recognition that NGOs provide a 
representative counterbalance to the other two international sectors.32 Braithwaite and Drahos 
consider that a strong civil society is a practical way to create trust norms in international 
society, which is important for effective collaboration.33 The representative and legitimising 
elements of NGO involvement in international regulation are discussed later in this paper.   
 
C  NGOs as regulators 
NGOs are capable of a wide variety of international regulatory activities.34 Hood et al define 
regulation thus:35 
There must be some capacity for standard-setting, to allow a distinction to be made between more or less 
preferred states of the system. There must also be some capacity for information-gathering or monitoring 
to produce knowledge about current or changing states of the system. On top of that must be some capacity 
for behaviour-modification to change the state of the system [emphasis added]. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Richard Youngs International Democracy and the West: The Roles of Governments, Civil Society, and 
Multinational Business (Oxford University Press, New York 2004) at 140.  
29 Anna-Karin Lindblom Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2005) at 15.  
30 Bridget M Hutter The Role of Non-State Actors in Regulation (Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science, April 2006, discussion paper 37) at 2. 
31 Anna-Karin Lindblom Non-Governmental Organisations in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2005) at 15.  
32 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 21, at 36.  
33 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 21, at 36.  
34 Steve Charnovitz "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance" (1997) 18 Mich J 
Int'l L 183 at 273.  
35 Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein & Robert Baldwin The Government of Risk (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001) at 23.  
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NGO activities can be broken down into these three categories.  This paper focuses on 
standard setting, but as the activities overlap substantially, 36 it is useful to outline the other 
regulatory activities that NGOs engage in. NGOs activities can influence international 
governmental organisations, private organisations, nation-states and individuals. Note that the 
variety of organisations classified as NGOs, the different kinds of NGOs involved in 
certification schemes, and the broad range of regulatory activities they undertake makes it 
difficult to generalise their activities, or to provide a clear and complete typology of the 
different regulations. The activities also vary over time.37 Further, some of the available 
functions are mutually exclusive and so are conducted by separate NGOs.38  
1. Information gathering 
One academic opined that all information gathering is central to all regulation.39 NGOs are 
particularly influential gatherers and disseminators of information.40 NGOs have conducted 
highly influential public information campaigns, and have advocated or lobbied international 
governmental organisations in more formal settings.41 Some NGOs have a comparative 
advantage over states or other organisations in terms of their knowledge resources and 
information networks, being able to "quickly and credibly generate politically usable 
information and move it to where it will have the most impact".42 NGOs also undertake 
                                                     
36 Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein & Robert Baldwin The Government of Risk (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001) at 21. 
37 See Steve Charnovitz "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance" (1997) 18 Mich 
J Int'l L 183.  
38 Steve Charnovitz "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance" (1997) 18 Mich J 
Int'l L 183 at 273.  
39 Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein & Robert Baldwin The Government of Risk (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001) at 24.  
40 Bridget M Hutter & Clive J Jones Business Risk Management Practices: The Influence of State Regulatory 
Agencies and Non-State Sources (The Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, Discussion paper) at 12.  
41 Bridget M Hutter & Joan O’Mahony The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Regulating Business (Centre 
for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, September 2004 
discussion paper), at 5.  
42 Daniel C Thomas "International NGOs, state sovereignty, and democratic values" (2001) 2 Chicago Journal 
of International Law 389 at 391. 
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monitoring activities, acting as watchdogs of different schemes or issues. Often, in fact, they 
have better information about compliance than states and international organisations.43 
Moreover, opportunities for NGOs to have influence have increased as the role of experts in 
international relations has become "increasingly more central" in a world reliant on scientific 
and technical knowledge.44 NGOs can provide expertise in advising international 
organisations, or as an expert submitting on an international dispute. Governments and 
international organisations also look to NGOs for advice and draw on their research.45 As is 
discussed later, information gathering and disseminating is a crucial part of several elements 
of certification scheme regulation.  
 
2. Behaviour Modification  
NGOs can attempt to modify behaviour with civil action like protests, press conferences and 
demonstrations.46 Generally such undertakings seek to influence business and corporate 
agendas, often directed at specific corporations.47 These actions tie in to information 
provision by requiring mass communication to stimulate the actions, and by being a form of 
publicity in themselves. NGOs also contribute to market-driven regulation, such as the 
creation of codes of conduct or certification schemes, by combining with consumers to apply 
economic pressure to businesses. In a more formal legal setting, NGOs can participate in 
private legal action in domestic litigation, albeit often in furtherance of a public not private 
                                                     
43 Bridget M Hutter & Joan O'Mahony The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Regulating Business (Centre 
for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, September 2004 
discussion paper) at 6.   
44 Caroline E Foster "New Clothes for the Emperor? Consultation of Experts by the International Court of 
Justice" (2014) 5 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 139 at 172. 
45 Jennifer A Zerk Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility (New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2006) at 97.   
46 Bridget M Hutter & Joan O'Mahony The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Regulating Business (Centre 
for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, September 2004 
discussion paper) at 6.  
47 Bridget M Hutter & Joan O’Mahony The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Regulating Business (Centre 
for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, September 2004 
discussion paper), at 7.  
13 
 
interests.48 For example, firms who misrepresent their compliance with standards have be 
sued by NGOs for false advertising.49 Occasionally, NGOs are also empowered to represent 
issues in more formal international legal forums, such as international courts and tribunals. 
This representation can have behavior-modification impacts.  
3. Standard setting 
A standard is a broad, vague term that can include almost any kind of rule.50 Standard-setting 
regulatory activities, which include communicating, monitoring and enforcing the standards, 
are particularly important at the international level, as they are often issued when 
international organisations lack authority to impose sanctions, as an alternative to binding 
directives.51 They may also be made by NGOs who perceive a gap in the regulation of states 
or international organisations, but often they are made by a combination of actors.52 The 
absence of a variety of international regulatory capabilities means that there is more space at 
the international level for standards than at the domestic level, as the standard-based 
organisations do not have to compete with domestic agencies and rules.53 Furthermore, the 
globalisation of markets means that international standards are particularly important and 
relevant,54 for practical reasons, such as technological compatibility across nations, or for 
normative issues like fair labour conditions. The global adoption of voluntary standards can 
                                                     
48 Bridget M Hutter & Joan O’Mahony The Role of Civil Society Organisations in Regulating Business (Centre 
for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, September 2004 
discussion paper), at 8.  
49 Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal "The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the 
Shadow of the State" in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds) The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton 
University Press, 2009) at 86.  
50 Nils Brunsson, Bengt Jacobsson and Associates A World of Standards (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2000) at 4.  
51 Nils Brunsson, Bengt Jacobsson and Associates A World of Standards (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2000) at 3.  
52 Kenneth W Abbott & Duncan Snidal “International regulation without international government: Improving 
IO performance through orchestration” (2010) 5 Rev Int Organ 315 at 316.  
53Nils Brunsson, Bengt Jacobsson and Associates A World of Standards (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2000) at 38.  
54Nils Brunsson, Bengt Jacobsson and Associates A World of Standards (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2000) at 38. 
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be a step that leads to more stringent regulation.55 Mexico, for example, has forest protection 
laws that are based on the standards of the Forest Stewardship Council.56  
 
These three groups of regulatory activities are in no way comprehensive. There are other 
ways of conceiving NGOs’ regulatory capabilities: they redistribute resources, a prime goal 
of many regulations,57 by collecting donations and using them to provide aid; they correct 
market failures brought on by information asymmetries; some directly provide public goods 
like education; others express consumer preferences; and many lobby to get issues onto 
agendas.58 Crucially, many of the issue areas that NGOs participate in areas where 
international governmental organisations or state actors are seen to be failing.59 Further, the 
activities interrelate, and many of those discussed in the different sections are relevant to the 
mechanisms around certification schemes.  
 
4. Certification Schemes 
Certification schemes are used in this paper as an illustrative example of international 
regulatory standard-setting. These neoliberal schemes rely on market mechanisms, and are 
generally based on consumer preferences.60 A certification scheme involves voluntary 
standards that NGOs set for other actors to comply with in return for belonging to a certain 
group. Such programmes have existed for centuries, but have grown dramatically over the 
                                                     
55 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 21, at 614. 
56 Stéphane Guéneau "Certification as a new private global forest governance system: The regulatory potential 
of the Forest Stewarship Council" paper for the conference Non-state Actors as Standard Setters: The Erosion 
of the Public-Private Divide Basel Institution on Governance, Basel, Switzerland 8 – 9 Feb 2007 at 17.  
57Bronwen Morgan & Karen Yeung An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) at 27. 
58 Steve Charnovitz "The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO Participation" [2011] 36 Brook J Int'l L 891 at 895.  
59 Bridget M Hutter The Role of Non-State Actors in Regulation (Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science, April 2006, discussion paper 37) at 12.  
60 Marie-Christine Renard "Quality certification, regulation and power in fair trade" (2005) 21 Journal of Rural 
Studies 419 at 419. 
15 
 
last two decades.61 Even though international standards are often soft regulation, being just 
"pieces of general advice"62 rather than command-and-control rules, incentives can be built in 
to the certification schemes that can result in effective compliance with the regulation.  Many 
of the schemes are created by NGOs or an NGO-firm collaboration.63  They involve many 
actors in different roles and relationships, creating new processes of standard setting, 
monitoring and enforcement.64  
 
Throughout this paper, two schemes will be used as main examples: the Forest Stewardship 
Council and the Fair Trade group. A common element of these schemes, and one that will be 
assumed when discussing certification schemes generally in this paper, is that their purpose is 
to further some kind of social value, as distinct from a scheme which has a solely practical 
purpose.  
 
The Forest Stewardship Council was founded in 1993 by a general assembly of 126 
participants from 26 countries, including representatives from the World Wide Fund for 
Nature, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, retailers, trade unions, and indigenous interest 
groups.65 The scheme was a response to an inability for an inter-governmental negotiation to 
collaborate on a forestry standards regime.66 The FSC involves three different types of 
standards, made by a policies and standards unit and approved by a board of directors.67 
                                                     
61 Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski The Voluntary Environmentalists (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2006) at 2.  
62Nils Brunsson, Bengt Jacobsson and Associates A World of Standards (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2000) at 2.  
63 Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal “The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the 
Shadow of the State” in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds) The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton 
University Press, 2009)  at 56.  
64 O'Rourke, above n 11, at 5.  
65 Phillipp Pattberg "What Role for Private Rule-Making in Global Environmental Governance? Analysing the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)" (2005) 5 International Environmental Agreements 175 at 179.  
66 Donald H Schepers "Challenges to Legitimacy at the Forest Stewardship Council" (2010) 92 Journal of 
Business Ethics 279 at 283. 
67 Phillipp Pattberg "What Role for Private Rule-Making in Global Environmental Governance? Analysing the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)" (2005) 5 International Environmental Agreements 175 at 180.  
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Often the standards are made or modified as a result of movements passed by the general 
assembly, which is made up of a variety of different stakeholders.68 External independent 
bodies certify that forestry operations are done in accordance with the FSC Principles and 
Criteria, and can also certify supply chains.69 As of July 2015, the FSC covers 80 countries 
with a total of more than 182 million hectares70 
 
Fair Trade was conceived by Oxfam, the Catholic aid agency for England and Wales, New 
Consumer, Tradecraft, Christian Aid and The World Development Foundation.71 The Fair 
Trade network is "an alternative approach to conventional trade" based on "a partnership 
between producers and consumers".72 Producers that meet the Fair Trade Standards, which 
include a minimum price for producers, are certified and can then use the Fair Trade 
trademark.73 Fair Trade also aims to foster long-term relationships between producers and 
buyers, eliminate the middle man, promote environmental protection and offer more flexible 
financial terms to producers.74 The Fair Labelling Organization is the international 
coordinating institution which was formed by the various national initiatives. Its role is to 
make criteria consistent and oversee the inspection and certification processes.75   
 
This Part illustrates the regulatory capacity that NGOs can exercise. With the increase in 
regulation by non-state actors 
 
                                                     
68 Forest Stewardship Council "Setting Standards" <ic.fsc.org> 
69 Donald H Schepers "Challenges to Legitimacy at the Forest Stewardship Council" (2010) 92 Journal of 
Business Ethics 279, at 283. 
70 Forest Stewardship Council Facts and Figures (3 July 2015) 
71 Len Tiu Wright & Simon Heaton "Fair Trade marketing: an exploration through qualitative research" (2006) 
14(4) Journal of Strategic Marketing 411 at 414.  
72 Fair Trade Labelling Organizations International "What is Fair Trade?" <www.fairtrade.net>  
73 Fair Trade Labelling Organizations International "What is Fair Trade?" <www.fairtrade.net> 
74 Will Low & Eileen Davenport "Mainstreaming fair trade: adoption, assimilation, appropriation" (2006) 14(4) 
Journal of Strategic Marketing 315 at 320. 
75 Marie-Christine Renard "Quality certification, regulation and power in fair trade" (2005) 21 Journal of Rural 
Studies 419 at 422.  
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V International regulatory environment  
A Challenges 
International regulation is a particularly ripe area for NGOs regulatory activities. In some 
areas of international regulation, there occurs a certain type of regulatory failure: while the 
regulatory institutions are intact, they do not achieve their purpose, and the regulations 
promulgated are largely symbolic.76 In several cases, such as international trade law, 
international regulation is successful, but in others, like reducing carbon emissions, 
regulation has been ineffective.77 There are a plethora of reasons why this is so, but some 
main features of the international regulatory environment the hamper the ability of 
international governmental organisaitons to undertake traditional regulation will be outlined 
here. 
 
First, and most marked, there is a lack of authority and coercive power at the international 
level. States have been reluctant to grant extensive authority to international government 
organisations for many reasons, including concerns over the democratic deficit of 
international organisations.78 Domestic actors often view international organisations with 
suspicion, as their very existence involves a loss of state sovereignty.79  Therefore while 
some international institutions enjoy the ability to impose significant sanctions, most notably 
the World Trade Organisation, this is an uncommon example. With no overarching coercive 
power at the international level equivalent to that of the nation-state at the domestic level that 
is able to force compliance, international regulatory bodies do not have available the full 
"pyramid of enforcement strategies".80 Instead, they operate at the lower, cooperative end of 
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the pyramid. Yet Ayers and Braithwaite found that the regulatory agencies that could operate 
the most at this lower level also had the most punitive options available: they "spoke softly 
while carrying big sticks”.81 At the international level, many actors are trying to operate 
exclusively at the cooperative end of the pyramid but without the coercive benefit of a 
"benign big gun". This means that regulators at the international level seeking to regulate via 
cooperation may need to explore alternative methods of enforcement, to provide some form 
of "benign big gun" incentive.  
 
 
There are other problems are related to the absence of an overarching 'world government'. 
Attempts to regulate are more likely to be incoherent and unorganised because of the lack of 
a coordinating power.82 Regulation is fragmented, with different international governmental 
organisations and other actors covering different areas, resulting in repetition and gaps.83 
Consequently, regulation is generally less well-coordinated than at the domestic level. With 
no single authority, there is competition for legitimacy, public attention and resources 
between different schemes. 84  
 
Another notable element of the international regulatory environment is that identifying and 
influencing the targets of the regulation is difficult. For one, international laws often target 
nation-states, relying on them to change their domestic laws, which are then intended to 
change the behaviour of the individuals or organisations engaging in the behaviour that 
requires regulation.85 This is problematic from the perspective of the international 
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organisation as the influence of international regulation is diluted, and 'slippage' in the 
stringency of the regulation can occur.86 Furthermore, even if the regulation is adopted as 
intended, national authorities encounter problems in attempting to make a difference to the 
activities of intended targets. The national authorities do not have the necessary jurisdiction 
nor the capacity to access all the relevant targets.87 Many targets of regulation are large 
international organisations, and have the ability to circumvent rules imposed by national laws 
by acting in different jurisdictions.88 A prevalent example is the different labour standards 
across the globe. Companies based in countries with strict labour regulations have undertaken 
enormous outsourcing operations to countries with cheaper, and in many instances less 
regulated, labour. Thus a perverse incentive can be created for states to have weak national 
regulation to attract business.89 In some cases the international organisation is the regulatory 
authority, and so has a broader jurisdiction, but aiming the regulatory gun is difficult with 
scattered and diffuse targets. 90 Abbot and Snidal sum up the issue: "not only do 
[international regulators] lack a big gun, they would not know where to aim it if they had 
one". 91  
 
While these factors are generalisations and do not apply in every case, they and other 
limitations have meant that in multiple instances, international regulation by states or 
international governmental organisations made up of states have been ineffective in terms of 
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the goal they were pursuing. Initial solutions focused on recreating traditional domestic 
regulatory tools.92 This often meant arguing for more international organisations with 
stronger powers.93 However, this is an unrealistic opinion the current environment where 
nation-states fiercely defend their rights to unrestrained state sovereignty.94 Many 
commentators have abandoned this solution, pointing instead to new kinds of governance that 
include many different actors.95 This also recognised that in international relations, 
cooperation is often vital. However, official considerations have tended to focus on the old 
forms.96 For NGOs, frustration with ineffectiveness can lead to the creation of non-state 
initiatives.97 The FSC, as noted previously, was created after NGOs became disillusioned 
with the formal international forest negotiation process.98 The FSC "implemented what the 
Rio Process was still talking about".99 The Max Havelaar coffee certification, which is now 
part of the Fair Trade group, was initially created at the behest of producers suffering from 
falling coffee prices, despite an International Coffee Agreement designed to support prices.100  
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B The Case for Collaboration 
Throughout the literature on international regulation, and particularly in relation to standard-
setting, the usefulness and prevalence of collaboration is a common theme. A variety of 
different actors contributing to regulation have been popular in new kinds of thinking about 
regulation at the domestic and international level: 101 
The classical command and control conception of regulation pays insufficient attention to the complex 
causality of regulatory effects. Essentially, the decentralized approach sees regulation as involving a 
plurality of types of actors, a variety of legal and non-legal norms and the use of techniques beyond 
that of the sovereign command of the state. This decentralized understanding of regulation has become 
the dominant paradigm in regulatory scholarship, including the study of global regulation.  
The three groups of actors typically identified are international governing organisations, 
business organisations, and the international civil society. This reflects the domestic triad of 
state, economic society and civil society. The different actor groups each possess different 
regulatory capacities.102 Facilitating collaboration and cooperation between the three has 
therefore been touted as a way to regulate at the international level, and to overcome the 
regulatory challenges posed by the particular structure of the international society. 
Increasingly, regulation occurs via "networks" of different actors.103 Describing the 
importance of "networks of governance", Braithwaite and Drahos note in their study of 
international business regulation that economic might does not necessarily equate to global 
influence, rather an actors' connections to other actors in the world system.104 This, they 
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explain, is why an NGO such as Greenpeace can have more global regulatory influence than 
a large multinational corporation such as Mitsubishi.105 At the core of transnational 
collaborative regulation is standard-setting.106 Transnational certification schemes, made 
through alliances between two of the groups, and on occasion all three, are rapidly becoming 
more common.107  
 
Collaborative regulation is not novel, although it took time for scholars to fully recognise its 
occurrence.108 From 1994 there has been a rapid expansion of international collaborative 
standard-setting schemes.109 An important development was the recognition that states do not 
have a monopoly on regulation, certainly not at the international level, and non-state actors 
like businesses and NGOs have their own sets of regulatory capacities. 110 As thinking has 
moved from 'government' to 'governance', one of the aspects of this shift has been the 
rejection of the traditional political model where government authorities are the only actors 
responsible for public affairs.111 The sources of international power are diffuse, and no single 
sector has the competencies required to regulate alone at the international level.112 
Collaboration enables the different capabilities of the three sectors to be utilised, and to 
counterbalance each other. The power of business in international sphere is often significant, 
                                                     
105 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 21, at 505.  
106 Kenneth W Abbott & Duncan Snidal “International regulation without international government: Improving 
IO performance through orchestration” (2010) 5 Rev Int Organ 315 at 316.  
107 Kenneth W Abbott & Duncan Snidal “International regulation without international government: Improving 
IO performance through orchestration” (2010) 5 Rev Int Organ 315 at 322.  
108 Peter N Grabosky "Using Non-governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance" (1995) 8(4) 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy & Administration 527 at 527-8.  
109 Kenneth W Abbott & Duncan Snidal “International regulation without international government: Improving 
IO performance through orchestration” (2010) 5 Rev Int Organ 315 at 322. 
110 Bronwen Morgan & Karen Yeung An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) at 4.  
111 Stéphane Guéneau "Certification as a new private global forest governance system: The regulatory potential 
of the Forest Stewardship Council" paper for the conference Non-state Actors as Standard Setters: The Erosion 
of the Public-Private Divide Basel Institution on Governance, Basel, Switzerland 8 – 9 Feb 2007 at 5.  
112Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal "Taking responsive regulation transnational: Strategies for 
international organizations" (2013) 7 Regulation & Governance 95at 97 & 103.  
23 
 
with the biggest organisations being larger and better funded than some states, even 
displaying some of the regulatory capabilities of government institutions.113 Even powerful 
states can be "captives of concentrated corporate interests which care enough about an issue 
to be willing to hurt their state's political leaders unless they do what they're told".114  
However, commentators also note that those large international corporations are not as 
unconstrained as they may appear.115 Economic interests are still vulnerable to the pressure 
of civil society and governing organisations.  
 
Abbot and Snidal undertake a detailed analysis of the different actors' competencies and how 
they may contribute to regulatory standard-setting.116 They identify independence, 
representativeness, expertise and operational capacity as an essential quadrant of qualities.117 
These are necessary in different ways at different stages of the governance process, which 
includes agenda-setting, rule-making, monitoring, enforcement and adjudication.118 These 
steps and the competencies cannot be neatly delineated from each other: different 
competencies are important at several steps in the process.119 Observing the necessary 
capacities for regulation supports an argument for collaboration, as at the international level 
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no single actor consistently possesses the necessary capacities.120 Well-functioning nation 
states in theory display these capabilities, even they at the international level will be 
somewhat lacking.121  
 
Collaboration is lauded as bringing with it a variety of benefits. It is argued that the parties 
are more committed to making a regulation work when they have participated in its 
development and so implementation is more likely to be successful.122 NGOs in particular, 
are often locked out of the process, with their only option being to "hurl missiles across the 
fence (mostly by scattergun media assaults)".123 Involving them is more productive and can 
moderate their position.124 Bringing in many actors also increases legitimacy and 
representation, and dialogue can help resolve conflicting values.125 Ultimately, much of the 
international regulatory community relies on norms and cross-sector pressure rather than 
coercion to affect behaviour:126  
…complex interdependency can induce cooperation, constituting normative communities, nurturing habits 
of compliance that are then institutionalized into bureaucratic routines, communicating informal praise and 
shame that are then institutionalized, and building capacity. When many different types of actors use many 
dialogic mechanisms of this sort, both impressive regime-building and impressive compliance have been 
repeatedly demonstrated.   
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Many regulatory commentators therefore argue for a mix of actors.127 Borrowing from 
domestic regulatory developments, then, international regulation has adopted the idea of 
regulation via non-hierarchical coordination involving many non-state actors, as an 
alternative or supplement to state governance.128 There are a variety of regulatory theorists, 
some responding to decentralisation at the domestic level, others to the lack of hierarchy at 
the international, whose theories that incorporate collaboration, and recognise the value of 
exercising the capabilities of NGOs.129  
 
In their seminal Responsive Regulation Ayers and Braithwaite support a domestic "mixed 
institutional order" where "the community, market, state, and associational order each are 
important in both challenging and constituting the power of the other".130 In particular, they 
argue for the inclusion of public interest groups under the theory of "tripartism".131 This 
involves certain public interest groups being selected to become fully-fledged third players in 
the regulatory game.132 The groups are given access to information, a seat at the negotiating 
table, and the same ability to enforce as the regulator.133 Among several other benefits, Ayers 
and Braithwaite argue that the groups will then act as a check on the regulator, by identifying 
and therefore holding accountable the regulator who fails to punish noncompliance.134 In this 
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they are enforcing a "metanorm" as they are regulating the regulator. Ayers and Braithwaite 
also argue that the inclusion of public interest groups can act as a counterweight to economic 
interests, in a similar argument to those made in support of civil society groups being a part 
of collaborative international regulation.135  A final aspect of tripartism that is relevant is the 
idea of contestability.136 This is based on the idea that only some of the public interest groups 
are given greater access. In theory, then, only legitimate groups are granted access, because 
those groups seeking to be a part of the process but not given access will act as a check. For 
example, if an NGO with the access rights is corrupt there will be a strong incentive on those 
NGOs without access to identify the corruption and publicise it, arguing for the corrupt 
NGO's removal.  
 
Tripartism is taken from domestic regulatory theory, premised on a strong state presence, and 
conceived from the state point of view. Therefore it is less relevant for looking at the role 
NGOs have in organising regulation or setting standards at the international level, but it does 
provide insight into how NGOs may be utilised in the global regulatory community, and the 
benefits of their role. The discussion is relevant for campaigns that argue for NGO standing 
in international courts and seats at negotiating tables. In terms of more access to information, 
tripartism's empowerment may be less relevant to international NGOs as their information 
capabilities can be greater than the international governing organisation. However, tripartism 
does provides a theoretical basis for a way to ensure that the most legitimate NGOs are 
involved. This is a helpful point, considering the difficulties defining NGO, and because the 
risk of accidentally empowering illegitimate NGOs is a difficulty if NGOs were to be more 
formally involved in international regulation. 
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C Blurring public and private regulation 
The increased involvement of various non-state actors in international regulation is part of a 
trend whereby the line between public and private regulation is becoming increasingly 
blurred, even at the domestic level. Morgan and Yeung note the variety of regulatory theories 
that have moved away from making a distinction between public and private interests.137  
Arguably, it is not possible to objectively distinguish between a public and a private 
interest.138 According to Ayers and Braithwaite, good policy is not a decision between the 
free market and government regulation.139 At the international level, the rise of international 
public-private partnerships is evidence of this lack of demarcation, with different actors 
motivated by different interests participating in regulatory standard-setting.140  
 
The blurring of regulatory boundaries is also a new development from the perspective of 
many NGOs: historically they have been suspicious of market mechanisms and privatised 
regulation.141 Many NGOs were active in arguing against the tide of globalisation. Now, 
however, the focus is on the problems themselves, such as social injustice or environmental 
degradation that may be fostered by free markets or globalisation.142 NGOs have become 
more willing to utilise market mechanisms on a global scale to change behaviour, particularly 
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with the increase in certification schemes. As Robert Howse notes, "the antiglobalizers have 
themselves gone global".143  
 
Certifications schemes are the epitome of the integration between public and private: they 
involve using private instruments to further what are usually public goals. They are "in the 
market, but not of it".144 Such schemes tend to aim to influence corporate behaviour in order 
to induce social or political change.145 This recognises that markets do not operate in profit-
orientated isolation, but are in fact influenced by social and political contexts.146 NGOs 
activities in this regard are different from other activities such as agenda setting or 
implementing agreements that are more likely emanate from or target international 
governmental actors.147 This means that NGOs and other non-state actors have gone from 
trying to influence public international regulation to creating regulation that sits outside of 
it.148  
 
The increase in private regulation at the global level comes with a proviso. Regulation by 
non-state actors will not always be an effective substitute for public regulation. First, there 
are democratic and accountability concerns with blurring the line between governments and 
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other actors. Corporate and civic actors may not be representative as they are driven by 
"profits and passions, respectively," yet they are posited alongside governments.149 
Moreover, non-state regulation will not always be effective: in some situations, market 
mechanisms will not be sufficient.150 There is a danger that focusing too much on private 
actor regulation will be to the detriment of necessary public regulation, or that public 
institutions will atrophy or fail to develop.151 For example, the Forest Stewardship Council 
certification standards cannot address fundamental problems with forest management such as 
land tenure insecurity; this requires legal intervention.152 As such, NGO regulation cannot be 
seen as a substitute for state or state-led regulatory systems,153 and any active delegation to 
non-state actors should not be wholesale.154 The limitations to certification scheme 
effectiveness, and NGO regulatory legitimacy, including their representative relative to 
elected or non-elected governments, are discussed later in this paper.  
D The limitations of collaboration 
The nature of collaboration means that it has inherent limitations. Bargaining among different 
actors with disparate goals and capacities is generally expensive, time-consuming and 
contentious.155  It involves voluntary commitment and compliance when the actors are not 
subject to each other's command, and yet they will likely have different interests and 
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perspectives.156 Without any incentive, or something aligning their interests there is the 
danger that agreement will not be reached.  At the domestic level, empirical evidence 
suggests that, akin to the description in the "benign big gun" theory, collaborative non-
hierarchical coordination involving non-state actors tends not to succeed unless it has a strong 
state in the background.157 Often, at the international level, a state-like coercive power to 
incentivise collaboration will be absent, particularly if it is a situation where a certification 
scheme is being created as a response to international governmental organisation or state 
failure. Borzel and Risse consider options for a functional equivalent to a state 'shadow'. 
Because collaboration is voluntary, some kind of incentive needs to be present for actors to 
come to the able. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the different motivations of 
the different groups of actors that may collaborate at the international level, but two 
incentives relevant to certification scheme standard setting will be touched on.  
 
Borzel and Risse rely on two logics in considering alternatives to a strong state. The logic of 
consequences taps into incentives that could influence self-interested, utility-maximising 
actors. The logic of appropriateness looks to normative structures that could induce actors to 
follow social rules.158 Under the logic of appropriateness, Borzel and Risse argue that it is 
possible to establish norms that put societal pressure on firms.159 Commentators acknowledge 
the role that NGOs have in establishing norms.160 NGOs are central in this regard as many 
use publicity and reputational targeting which create changes in expectations. In contributing 
to the establishment of norms, NGOs are acting in the "backdrop" of regulation; in the 
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context rather than the content.161 However, many are then involved in partnerships with 
corporations to create standards for firms to comply with. An example is the increase in 
prevalence of the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility, and the significant number of 
NGO-firm collaborative schemes to improve firm practices.162 As these norms become more 
ingrained, firms become induced to comply via the logic of consequences. That is, as norms 
are well-established, and consumers care more about them, the firms gain a commercial 
advantage by complying.163 In this way, a socially conscious market can act as an incentive 
for collaboration. These logics support the use of certification schemes in being effective 
collaborative regulation at the international level, as in theory they are collaborations driven 
by norms and/or a socially conscious market. 
 
Under the self-interested logic of consequences, a potential incentive is the risk that if 'soft' 
regulation is not implemented, there will be stricter regulation created by states or 
international governmental organisations.164 Corporations have an interest in having more 
flexible regulation, and so may create their own standards, partnering with NGOs to improve 
the policies and provide legitimacy. These incentives to collaborate relate to the reasons a 
firm may adopt a certification scheme, which are discussed later in this paper. 
 
E Theoretical nature of the literature   
As a final point, an issue with the theories developed in the literature is that they are abstract 
and highly theoretical, and rarely supported by empirical evidence.  The theorists do often 
appreciate this shortcoming: Ayers and Braithwaite concede that their tripartism is "purely 
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theoretical and generally in its application" and is not "a practical proposal ready for 
implementation".165 They recognise that all they have done is show that there are theoretical 
reasons that indicate that tripartism may work, and so recommend a practical analysis to 
determine the conditions where it would work and when it would not.166 Abbot and Snidal 
acknowledge that their theory of orchestration is "somewhat speculative and suggestive at 
this stage".167 Borzel and Risse make a similar concession, noting that there are likely to be 
conditions under which their theories will work and others where it will not.168 Hutter notes 
that there has been little practical research into the regulatory activities of NGOs, and this 
hinders assessment of the theories in practice.169 Therefore in any application of these 
theories, the fact that their limits have not been tested must be remembered.   
 
 
VI Certification Scheme Mechanisms 
In this Part, the mechanisms of certification schemes are canvassed. Being a general 
discussion, the quirks of individual schemes are not provided for. Further, the sections are not 
completely distinct and often interrelate. Finally, note that the "template" certification scheme 
in this analysis is a scheme holding a social value as a purpose, with corporations as its main 
regulatory target, created via a collaboration of actors.  
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A Agenda-setting 
Agenda-setting is a core regulatory activity, undertaken at the beginning of the process.170 
Before anything can be done, the issue must first be placed on the political agenda and the 
relevant groups must be galvanised to act.171 As discussed above, this may require some 
external incentive. NGOs often play a significant role in this stage at the international level 
generally,172 but particularly in relation to certification scheme standard-setting. NGOs are 
able to conduct core agenda-setting activities such as collecting and disseminating 
information, framing issues powerfully and capturing public attention.173 For example, when 
the movement against blood diamonds was created, it involved NGOs framing the issue; 
creating the "new" problem that trade in diamonds funded wars.174 Often, the impetus of a 
certification scheme is some kind of consumer action, led by NGOs. Forest certification 
schemes are an example: several forest certification schemes, precursors to the FSC, were 
created as a response to consumer boycotts.175 Activist groups across Europe protested, 
picketed and petitioned against retailers known to be selling tropical timber, most of which 
was unsustainable. Imports of tropical timber plummeted.176 Producers thus had a strong 
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incentive to establish labelling to open markets that were closing by consumer activism.177 
Bartley, in fact, considers that the emergence of the private regulation was caused in part by 
social movement campaigns targeting companies.178 Civic action, as evidence of Borzel and 
Risse’s “socially conscious market” can push issues onto the agenda of the relevant 
international actors. 179 
 
B Creating standards 
Creating the standards and the systems around them is a difficult process, particularly if it a 
collaborative effort with a variety of different actors involved. The types of standards made 
are vital for the success of the scheme. The Forest Stewardship Council, for example, stands 
out among other forestry certification schemes because its standards are stricter.180 However, 
the standards must be rationally connected to the purpose: the Forest Stewardship Council 
has nevertheless been criticised for not actually changing the behaviour of corporations, as 
many of the corporations' forestry activities were above the standards that the FSC set when 
it was implemented.181 Being international certification schemes, setting consistent and 
meaningful standards for different countries and contexts is also challenging. For example, 
the FSC has had problems with its standards being impractical at local levels, particularly in 
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tropical countries. In some countries the standards even conflicted with local laws.182 The 
FSC therefore created national initiatives in certain tropical countries to adapt FSC principles 
to the local context.183 This, however, risks undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the scheme by having inconsistent standards.  
 
In overseeing and modifying the standards, schemes such as Fair Trade and the FSC have 
sought to have a diverse range of representation within their governing structure.184 This 
arguably improves the schemes’ legitimacy and makes them democratic, but involving a 
variety of stakeholders has an ancillary benefit. In doing so, a scheme can provide a political 
space that may not be available elsewhere. Both Fair Trade and the FSC act as a political 
forum for their respective stakeholders, by requiring their national bodies to consult with the 
local stakeholders. This aspect of both schemes is significant, as in some countries they are 
the only forums for discussion and consultation of broader forest issues,185 and some 
governments have limited opportunities for negotiation in regulation of markets in products 
such as coffee.186 Consequently, community and indigenous groups are provided with better 
access to public policy.187 Furthermore, explicit inclusion of national NGOs in deliberations, 
in some cases providing greater access than the rights granted under national legislation, acts 
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to develop the civil society of the particular country.188 This, as discussed previously, is 
considered positive for the democratic development of a society.  
C Scheme Adoption 
The default impression of business is that in profit maximising, they seek to externalise all 
possible costs.189  On this view, it does not logically follow that they would voluntarily 
adhere to standards that in many cases increase costs.  However, if NGOs can provide norms 
that appeal to the logic of appropriateness and economic incentives that appeal to the logic of 
consequences, both discussed earlier, there can be impressive take-up of standards.190  
Certification schemes, characterised as "clubs" by one author, provide benefits for those who 
comply with the standards, and those who do not comply are excluded.191 The benefit is 
usually some kind of positive image and reputation that will, in theory, make an impression 
on stakeholders.  
 
From the perspective of a rational, profit-maximising firm, the benefit provided by the 
schemes is competitive advantage in a world where consumers are increasingly concerned 
with corporate responsibility:192 
Selling poorly performing, unsafe, or environmentally damaging products is not a route to real 
competitive advantage in sophisticated industry and industry segments, especially in a world where 
environmental sensitivity and concern for social welfare are rising in all advanced nations. 
While initially the firms who chose to comply with the standards may suffer a cost 
disadvantage, in the longer-term they can generate sustainable competitive advantage.193 
Porter even contends that strict standards result in more innovation and more long-sighted 
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planning, both of which he alleges, are beneficial to businesses.194 Certification schemes are 
an effective way of communicating with consumers; they provide firms with a way for their 
potential customers to easily and cheaply differentiate socially conscious firms from 
laggards.195 Joining a scheme is also better than an organisation trying to get these benefits 
alone, as generating the necessary legitimacy is easier with many players, and there are 
economies of scale in terms of communicating the scheme.  Firms can also use schemes as a 
risk management strategy, to hedge their bets in the reputation game.196 One manager said of 
the reasons for joining the Forest Stewardship Council: 
 We weren't ever going to have customers demanding sustainable timber in our stores. But we knew 
that if our name, B&Q, was associated with destruction of tropical forests or even temperate forests, 
our brand name . . . would be damaged. 
Reputation played a significant part in the establishment of the Kimberly Process 
Certification Scheme. The diamond industry felt that the association with international 
conflict would undermine the image of diamonds as high-quality symbols of love. For them, 
the "blood diamond" campaign created a high risk of irrevocable consumer backlash.197 
Creating a certification process was a way to maintain demand, which was threatening to 
plummet, by creating "conflict-free" diamonds.198 Finally, it is possible for other international 
actors to encourage the adoption of schemes. The Forest Stewardship Council, for example, 
is supported by other NGOs such as Greenpeace; the World Trade organisation has officially 
endorsed it; and some investment banks require FSC certification as a condition for 
capital.199 
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In using certification to manage reputation risk, there is a more indirect benefit than a direct 
price premium or market access advantage. This is part of a broader trend towards Corporate 
Social Responsibility, whereby firms are expected to consider broader social issues, not just 
their shareholders.200 This is an example of the norms or societal pressure discussed in Part 
III. As such, firms are being motivated less by direct profit advantage (the logic of 
consequences) and more by the norms and expectations (the logic of appropriateness). For 
example, companies that fail to acknowledge ethical and social issues "risk being labelled 
dinosaurs".201 This more indirect motivation for joining a certification scheme is evident in 
when suppliers and retailers commit to certified products even when there is not necessarily 
the consumer demand for certified products, or the certified product does not attract a 
premium price. This is the case with certified forest products.202 Strategically, the FSC has 
campaigned retailers and importers to commit to buying only FSC-certified products.203 This 
they have done, particularly in certain industries dominated by a small number of large 
multinationals with strong brand names.204 Consequently, the general expectation of 
responsibility, often driven by NGO campaigns, can lead to adoption of certification schemes 
even if the profit benefit is less immediate. 
 
 
A challenge for this part of certification schemes is in the initial stage, where firms need to be 
convinced of the advantages of joining the scheme. Without participants, the scheme will 
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lack recognition and legitimacy. Creating sufficient momentum and support is vital. 
Braithwaite and Drahos propose a 'divide and conquer' strategy as a way for NGOs to achieve 
global adoption of standards.205 Essentially, if an NGO can persuade an innovator of the 
benefits of adopting a scheme early, then that firm becomes an advocate for the standard 
being adopted, as greater adoption tends to bring more recognition. 206 Something of the kind 
occurred in the international market for Fair Trade coffee. The major players in the supply 
chain were the roasters, and they were large transnational corporations that dominated the 
market.207 Smaller roasters were successful in targeting niche markets, such as those 
consumers who valued sustainable or ethical coffee (Fair Trade), as a way to compete. 208  
Demand for such coffee grew, and the Fair Trade brand has subsequently been adopted by 
larger roasters.209  
 
Getting groups of firms on board can also lead to those firms arguing for the adoption of the 
standards into international law, as it may be a significant advantage to them, if they are 
already compliant, for the standards to then be imposed on their competitors, who would 
have to adapt their practices potentially at a great up-front cost.210 Germany, as a nation-state 
example, led the European nitrogen oxide emissions reductions negotiations aimed at 
reducing acid rain, because German cars were already required to have the necessary 
technology, and German firms were leading emissions-reduction technology.211 
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D Creating consumer demand 
Consumers are crucial elements in the certification scheme standard-setting: "the most vivid 
examples of private regulation may be seen in situations characterized by supply chain 
pressure, inspired by consumer preferences".212  The success of a certification scheme can be 
contingent on firms thinking that their target market is going to be more likely to purchase 
their product or pay more for it if the firm complies with standards that reflect certain values. 
Whether consumers do so depends on their awareness and acceptance of the issue; awareness 
and acceptance of the particular scheme; and then the consumers changing their purchasing 
habits as a result of the scheme's influence.  
 
In today's world, concern for the negative global consequences of international trade, such as 
environmental damage and threats to social welfare, is rising in the general population.213 
Many buyers now appreciate safer, cleaner, quieter products,214 and are demanding more 
information about supply chains.215 Forms of consumption are changing, and buyers now 
look for products that represent certain values, as "self-actualising consumers".216  The 
problem, however, with these kinds of values is that many are process-based, or they are 
attributes that cannot be verified by the consumers themselves.217 Such goods are called 
"credence goods", which have "credence attributes", such as paying workers a fair wage or 
being environmentally sustainable.218 The attributes then must be communicated to 
consumers in some way, but it requires their confidence in the source of the information. This 
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confidence, however, is difficult to earn, and credence goods are vulnerable to fraud or 
opportunistic behaviour.219 Therefore there is a vital role for independent certification 
schemes to play, in providing such information and facilitating consumers' desire to enforce 
social values through their purchasing decisions. This also means that when the certification 
mark message is being conveyed, legitimacy is crucial, as consumers need to trust the 
scheme's effectiveness. The perceived legitimacy of the standard scheme turns on whether the 
standards themselves are sufficiently strict and are able to achieve the goal; and on whether 
there is compliance, or at least perceived compliance, with those standards. 
 
Certification schemes are advantageous because, as mentioned above, they are an easy and 
low-cost way for consumers to discriminate between different organisations.220 Empirical 
research has shown that consumers are willing to pay more for "credence products" that are 
certified,221 although this willingness does depend on the particular value or process.222  
Consumer awareness of both the issue and the certification scheme is central to their ability 
to discriminate, and awareness requires effective marketing by the scheme and its 
participants. This is often challenging, as the scheme in some cases represents a complex 
ideology. Fair Trade, for example is about more than just fair prices for producers, but about 
long-term relationships with suppliers, caring for the environment, flexible financial terms, 
community development, and a quality product.223 However, rapid communication of so 
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many characteristics is difficult.224 Market research has found that customers did not have a 
clear idea of the full ideology behind the Fair Trade brand.225 Overcoming this is particularly 
difficult if consumers lack the time or motivation to ascertain the meaning of Fair Trade for 
themselves.226 Studies have shown that customers may spend as little as four seconds 
examining a supermarket shelf.227 The danger with a lack of full understanding or with 
oversimplification is that there will be approbation of the Fair Trade idea by other companies, 
who can exploit the consumers' weak understanding of what Fair Trade stands for by 
presenting their own "ethical" product as akin to the Fair Trade label.228 This results in 
consumer confusion and reduced loyalty at the point of sale.229  
 
A challenge that results from this consumer-driven element of certification schemes is that 
some markets lack ethically minded consumers, such as business to business commodities or 
markets in developing countries.230 Forest products are predominantly sold on domestic 
markets, many of which care little about certification, with only 10% of global timber 
production entering international trade.231 Africa produces 36% of the world's bananas, yet 
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makes up only 1% of the global certified bananas.232 Moreover, when there does exist a 
market with ethical consumers, there is evidence to suggest that is consumers' good intentions 
do not always correlate with a change in behaviour.233 A recent poll found that while 83% of 
consumers intended to act ethically, only 18% did so.234 These issues highlight the 
importance of a certification scheme's communication and marketing, and the difficulty in 
relying on global markets as regulatory tools.   
 
E The role of supply chains 
Different players in the chain can have significant influence over other actors in the same 
supply chain. Certification scheme regulation is particularly successful where large 
international bodies dominate a part of the supply chain, creating a bottleneck, and demand 
certification from those above them in the chain.235 Major transnational corporations enjoy 
enormous purchasing power: one study quoted a source who said "When McDonald’s says 
'Jump', 500 suppliers say 'How high?'".236 In April 2005, Greenpeace protested at several 
McDonald’s restaurants, accusing the corporation of purchasing soy from companies that 
were causing deforestation of the Amazon.237 McDonalds and other similarly targeted 
companies reacted rapidly, demanding that their Brazilian soy traders join ABIOVE 
(Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries) and cease trading products that contribute 
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to Amazon deforestation.238 Less punitively, some transnational corporations favour certified 
suppliers: IBM have said that they prefer suppliers certified by the environmental 
management standard promulgated by the International Organisation for Standardization 
(ISO 14000). A firm that adopted ISO 14000 would therefore gain an advantage over 
competitors.239 For companies in developing countries, compliance with international 
standards can be a prerequisite to enter global markets.240 Environmental standards have been 
particularly wide-spread, with Vandenbergh noting in 2007 that more than half of the largest 
US firms in eight different retail and industrial sectors impose environmental requirements on 
their suppliers.241 In this way, the push for the adoption of the scheme comes not from a 
producer seeking a particular benefit, but by purchasers lower in the supply chain requiring 
the certification of their suppliers. This power is akin to the consumer power in choosing 
certified products, but amplified as individual purchasers have significantly more purchasing 
power than individual consumers.  
 
F Monitoring and Enforcement 
As mentioned above, monitoring and enforcement is crucial for the scheme to be taken 
seriously. Weak or unconvincing compliance is where schemes may fall down. Without 
effective monitoring and enforcement, the incentive is for firms to free-ride on the benefits of 
the scheme without complying, and this undermines the legitimacy of the scheme.242 The 
reputation of the scheme and its achievement of its objectives is reliant on members 
improving their performance.243  
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Monitoring aims to assess compliance with the standard, and in doing so to improve 
compliance levels.244 There are many practical considerations for designing methods of 
monitoring compliance with schemes, and these depend on a variety of factors, including the 
subject of the standard, the target of the regulation and the resources of the standard-setter or 
enforcer. Different versions of monitoring activities can be more or less effective, but an 
important element is independence from the organisation being assessed, to provide 
legitimacy. It is not uncommon for auditors responsible for monitoring compliance to be paid 
by the firms they are tasked with monitoring,245 which is problematic for the actual 
effectiveness of the monitoring and the appearance of effectiveness. To improve this, a 
system of independent certification bodies have been established for many schemes, certified 
be a separate NGO.246 
 
Enforcement is defined as "the application of rewards and penalties" but can also include 
"managerial" techniques as well.247  Certification schemes, while not being tradition 
regulatory tools,  are able to have sanctions analogous to the "pyramids of enforcement" 
exercised by domestic regulatory agencies, where less severe sanctions are used initially, and 
escalated as necessary.248 For example, if a firm fails to comply, the scheme can remove the 
benefit bestowed by the scheme; by withdrawing the license to use the brand, for example. 249 
This withdrawal can be subsequently reversed. In the case of continued noncompliance, the 
scheme can permanently ban a member. Finally, in the most severe cases, the scheme could 
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publicly denounce the firm, so that consumers can "heap scorn and punishment" on the 
firms.250 Naming and shaming is thus an important tool to enforce compliance,251 and this is 
particularly effective if the firm has a strong brand name to protect.252  
 
The underlying theory of the sanctioning tools, and how to escalate them, can be applied in 
practice in a variety of ways. For example, in enforcing the Congo Basin forest concession 
monitoring system, breaches are given media coverage, which applies reputational pressure 
to the company at fault. If the company fails to comply after a certain timeframe, its 
certificate of legality can be withdrawn.253 This displays a pyramid of escalation, if a 
somewhat limited one.  
 
Enforcement can be problematic for many schemes. For example, the Kimberley Process is 
criticised for its lack of clear sanctions.254 It is a scheme where states are the targets, and it 
has encountered enforcement difficulties with weak states, corruption and inconsistent 
commitment to its standards.255 Fair Trade, which has high reliance on the support of large 
corporations may encounter problems enforcing noncompliance by those bodies. For 
example, if Starbucks was shown to be noncompliant, would it be practically possible for the 
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American Fair Trade body, Transfair, to strip Starbucks of its label?256 This kind of reliance 
is major danger for schemes reliant on powerful external actors for support.  
 
The mechanisms of certification schemes demonstrate the many different facets to a 
functional scheme and the different ways international actors participate in the schemes. 
NGOs are valuable throughout the process, particularly in their ability to communicate with 
the public and to provide legitimacy. 
 
VII An Evaluation of NGO participation  
 
NGOs are highly involved in certifications scheme standard setting. Many of their 
capabilities are beneficial for a functional scheme, such as their independence and 
information sharing abilities. In this section, the contribution of NGOs is assessed. A 
weakness of this assessment is that it is a generalisation: not all NGOs will display the 
attributes discussed.  
A Improving regulation 
One obvious advantage of NGO involvement in collaborative standard-setting is that they 
have capabilities that other actors lack.257 These activities include the ability to use 
reputational damage as a sanction, to communicate with local communities, and to gather 
information. Further, NGOs provide a different perspective, which may improve the end 
result of the regulation.258 One academic said that NGOs are often the source of more 
innovative regulatory solutions.259 NGOs do, however, have their own weaknesses: for 
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example they often lack business expertise, resources, and access.260 As mentioned above, 
many commentators, speaking to both domestic and international regulation, say that a mix of 
regulatory actors is desirable to balance the different capabilities.261  
 
NGOs are particularly capable at mobilising public opinion. This is vital for bringing issues 
onto the agenda. Several commentators opine that NGOs are at their most influential in this 
area, for example when organising consumer boycotts or igniting public opinion.262 This 
ability is useful for creating concern for the issue itself; the more consumers know and care 
about issues, the more they will apply economic pressure to firms.263 An example is the rise 
of the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility. This concept was transformed from a 
fringe issue to a mainstream concern largely because of the efforts of a diverse group of 
NGOs.264  
 
A potential problem here is the danger that NGOs are too effective, being overzealous in 
fanning the flame of public opinion. Inciting a mass response can cause extreme policy 
incoherence.265 Grabosky notes that the sword of citizen participation is double-edged, and 
warns of 'wiki witch hunts'.266 Such is the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the tool 
some NGOs are trying to use on targets. This can result in disproportionate or misdirected 
results relative to the regulatory goal, and so should be a consideration when escalating 
enforcement mechanisms in a certification scheme.  
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While NGO regulation has strengths, it is important that any regulatory activities they engage 
in are actually effective. Some skeptics question whether NGOs are capable of being 
effectively influential. 267  A particular risk for environmental certification schemes, for 
example, is 'greenwashing' where firms claim to be following a set of environmental 
standards, but are simply using the standards as publicity while not making environmental 
improvements. Ineffectiveness, besides failing to achieve the regulatory goal, undermines 
public confidence in the schemes generally.268 This is a particular issue for certification 
schemes: as mentioned above, they are reliant on the public to trust the regulation, to be 
induced to change their purchase decisions. Unfortunately, environmental certification 
programmes in particular vary in effectiveness. 269 Certification scheme effectiveness is more 
thoroughly discussed in the next section.  
 
Being ineffective is one danger, but the greater one is making the situation worse. NGO 
activities are not necessarily going to improve the situation.270 Some standards have been 
criticised for having unintended consequences that go against the goal of the scheme. An 
example is the market barrier effect that the FSC has had on small producers: the cost of 
being certified hinders producers in the areas with the most threatened forests from 
joining.271 This is clearly an issue, as ineffective NGO activities, more than anything, would 
mean a significant amount of capital from a variety of donors was misemployed.   
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B Legitimacy and accountability 
Alongside the more practical benefits, NGOs participation is also arguably an inherent good, 
independent of outcomes.272 The basis for this is the idea that participation by different actors 
is per se beneficial, as it means a broad range of interests are represented, and so the process 
is more democratic and legitimate.273 Empowering NGOs "means creating a more vital, 
active democracy – a democracy less under the thumb of the corporate sector."274 As 
representatives of the international civil society, NGOs are often included in the process 
because their presence is seen as legitimising or democratising it.275 This is particularly 
relevant at the international level because of criticisms of a democratic deficit within 
international organisations.276 NGOs can counteract governments' tendency to "exaggerate 
the divergent interests of territorial groups organized into nation states, and to under 
emphasize the common interests that cut across national boundaries".277 Furthermore, an 
NGO's legimitising influence is important for building trust in the certification scheme, as 
discussed previously.  
 
NGOs' democratic and representative influence is not unequivocally accepted.  Many point 
out that NGOs are not democratic themselves, and they do not necessarily have internal or 
external accountability mechanisms.278 That is, members may not scrutinising the activities 
of their leaders;279  and that unlike many international public organisations, NGOs are not 
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held to any set of external standards.280 There have been situations where NGOs have been 
accused, whether well-founded or not, of distorting facts, manipulating evidence, 
exaggerating risk and misleading their supporters. "[H]istory is littered with cases of [NGOs] 
caught with their snouts in the trough".281 This undermines part of the rationale for including 
NGOs in international regulation. There is a counter-argument, however, which is that the 
structure of many NGOs, requiring membership and support in order to exist, with easy opt-
out options, does provide accountability mechanisms.282 While states are put on a pedestal as 
being representatives of their people,283 not all states are functioning, democratic or 
accountable.284 Further, even in those democratic states accountable to an electorate, voting is 
a crude tool for holding governments' accountable for their international activities.285 
Nevertheless, the accountability of NGOs is in question, and as a result there have been calls 
for an NGO code of conduct or greater transparency.286  
 
Paralleling the legitimising function, NGOs are often perceived as independent. This is part 
of what provides legitimacy, but is also a useful regulatory capability. It enables NGOs to act 
as a check on other international actors, in some cases as external watchdogs.287 
Independence is particularly relevant for monitoring and enforcement of certification 
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schemes.288 NGOs can facilitate trust in a certification scheme's authenticity and 
effectiveness. NGOs often have goals that are equal to or closely aligned with the 
certification schemes, making their intentions in supporting a scheme more transparent and 
genuine. Surveys have shown that NGOs are trusted information providers, particularly when 
compared to other sources.289 A poll found that NGOs were trusted more than government 
ministers or scientists when it came to advice on pollution, and scientists were trusted 
significantly more if they worked for an NGO than if they worked for industry or even the 
government.290  If a certification scheme is run solely by business interests, it is inherently 
not independent, and so can lack credibility from the consumers' perspective, even if the 
businesses are sincere.291 
 
However, there are suspicions around whether NGOs are genuinely a benevolent and 
independent influence.292 Studies have shown that NGOs are less effective,293 and less vocal 
in their criticism294 when they are funded by a single source, or by governments. More 
directly, dependence on certain funding may hinder an NGO's independence: for example, 
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NGOs funded by the European Commission "must not, directly or indirectly, send messages 
which conflict with Community policies or be associated with an image which is not in 
keeping with that of the institutions." In some cases NGOs have even been accused of being 
used as instruments to boost governmental strategic interests.295 The fact that there is a 
"revolving door" of personnel between government and NGOs may also mar their 
independence.296 However, this criticism is something NGOs are aware of and attempting to 
refuse: the FSC for example explicitly excludes governments from their membership to 
maintain their independence.297  
 
C Driven by ideologies 
A distinctive attribute of NGOs is that often they represent specific ideals: many NGOs are 
"value actors" who are motivated by principled beliefs rather than a direct stake.298 By being 
ideologically motivated they temper the self-interest of the private sector, and even of 
international governmental organisations.299 They can also act as a counterweight to the 
nationalism of states.300 Furthermore, by representing particular issues NGOs can be a 
mechanism for people to express political preferences, better than a market can. Often an 
individual's political and consumption choices are different, with political choices being more 
aspirational.301 Individuals may want to pre-commit to something they consider to be 
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beneficial to society, even if their consumption choices do not reflect this.302 For example, a 
person may value environmental protection, and so donate money to an NGO such as 
Greenpeace, but then go on to make consumption choices that are bad for the environment.  
In this way, NGOs can represent the values of society better than markets can, because 
relying solely on a free market results in individual action, which may not be consistent with 
the individual's political beliefs. 303In this situation, the fact that NGOs often represent 
specific interests or issues is democratically useful, and reinforces their role as civil society 
representatives.  
 
Being ideologically motivated can have negative results. NGOs may argue for their cause 
regardless of the trade-offs, such as protecting a species from extinction regardless of the 
economic effects. That is, NGOs may not act "rational maximisers of public interest" but 
instead as a "knight on a white charger." 304 NGOs may have to act in this way: an NGO that 
compromises could be seen as selling out, and lose their public support.305 A way to mitigate 
this tendency to be uncompromising is involving the NGOs in the regulation.  The argument 
is that an un-empowered NGO only has symbolic but largely unhelpful victories to report to 
their supporters, but that an empowered NGO will be encouraged to moderate its position and 
will be more willing to work towards more realistic solutions.306  
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VIII  Certification Scheme Weaknesses 
A Scheme Effectiveness 
Effectiveness means the ability to produce a desired or intended result.307 Certification 
schemes' goals are generally particular to the individual scheme, although many overlap. 
Assessing any schemes' ability to achieve its goal is incredibly difficult, as there are many 
different variables and the counterfactuals are highly complex.308 Even measuring the 
impacts of a scheme is challenging, with a multiplicity of methodological issues.309 
Furthermore the publicly available data is incomplete, blocking complete analysis of how 
well these systems of regulation perform.310  Moreover, the goals of a scheme may not 
provide a concrete measure of success for impacts to be evaluated against.  For example, the 
FSC's mission is to "promote environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and 
economically viable management of the world's forests".311 The Kimberley Processes' goal is 
to "stem the flow of conflict diamonds".312 Furthermore, often for practical reasons a proxy 
measurement is used, for example measuring the proportion of the particular industry that has 
been certified rather than the improvement in biodiversity. If the standard itself is not 
stringent, or the enforcement lacking, the proxy will not be an accurate reflection of the 
scheme's impact.  
 
The two schemes mentioned above have had their effectiveness questioned. It is estimated 
that the Kimberley Process has had a significant increase in the level of certified diamonds 
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and was associated with a perceived decline in violence.313 However, the scheme has been 
criticised for weaknesses in enforcement and sanctions.314 Global Witness, one of the NGOs 
involved in the scheme from its inception, resigned from the Kimberley Process in 2011, 
saying that because of loopholes in the Process "diamonds association with [human rights] 
abuses are still contaminating global markets".315  
 
The FSC has been criticsed for not creating meaningful change, and for failing to make a 
difference in areas where change is most needed. The majority of certification has occurred in 
temperate and boreal Northern forests, where some corporations where already compliant, 
and where the forests are less vital to global biodiversity than the tropical areas.316 Some 
inadvertent negative consequences of the scheme have been recognised: that the scheme has 
benefitted the larger market incumbents, possibly creating an expensive barrier to entry that 
exacerbates inequalities among the different producers.317 This in turn affects effectiveness as 
it is one of the reasons certification is more uncommon in the most threatened, tropical 
forests.318 Similarly problematic is the scheme's failure to provide a minimum price for 
                                                     
313 Virginia Haufler “The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and 
Conflict Prevention” (2009) 89 Journal of Business Ethics 403 at 403 and 411.  
314 Virginia Haufler “The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and 
Conflict Prevention” (2009) 89 Journal of Business Ethics 403 at 412.  
315 Global Witness "The Kimberly Process" (1 April 2013) <www.globalwitness.org> 
316 Peter Leigh Taylor "In the Market But Not of It: Fair Trade Coffee and Forest Stewardship Council 
Certification as Market-Based Social Change" (2005) 33(1) World Development 129  at 136, Stéphane Guéneau 
"Certification as a new private global forest governance system: The regulatory potential of the Forest 
Stewardship Council" paper for the conference Non-state Actors as Standard Setters: The Erosion of the Public-
Private Divide Basel Institution on Governance, Basel, Switzerland 8 – 9 Feb 2007, at 13. 
317 Peter Leigh Taylor "In the Market But Not of It: Fair Trade Coffee and Forest Stewardship Council 
Certification as Market-Based Social Change" (2005) 33(1) World Development 129 at 137 and Phillipp 
Pattberg “What Role for Private Rule-Making in Global Environmental Governance? Analysing the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC)” (2005) 5 International Environmental Agreements 175 at 186.  
318 Peter Leigh Taylor "In the Market But Not of It: Fair Trade Coffee and Forest Stewardship Council 
Certification as Market-Based Social Change" (2005) 33(1) World Development 129 at 138.  
57 
 
small-scale producers, which is clearly beyond the direct purpose of the scheme, but is 
nevertheless an issue for the viability of it in the more threatened areas.319 
 
To summarise, schemes are critised for making too little difference, but also for failing to 
address interrelated issues that hinder effectiveness. It is highly difficult to decide what a 
schemes' measure of success is, and usually even more difficult to then assess the scheme's 
impact on that measure. This is problematic for analysing the scheme, but also for assessing 
the value of NGOs' contribution to international regulation.  
 
B Market Management 
For the main schemes discussed in this paper, a significant challenge is their reliance on the 
market as an integral part of the regulation. Challenges mentioned earlier in this paper are the 
reliance on there existing a market for products with the particular social value; 
distinguishing the scheme from less robust ones; and communicating complex values to time-
poor consumers. These challenges require careful marketing strategies and management of 
supply and demand.  
 
In addition, schemes have encountered difficulties with the supply and demand of certified 
products. For products certified by a sustainability scheme, supply significantly outstrips 
demand.320 This oversupply means that a significant amount of produce is compliant with a 
certification scheme but sold as a normal product. On all the commodities in a State of 
Sustainability Initiative report, on average only 44% of all compliant produce was actually 
sold as compliant.321 It is estimated that Latin America, Africa and Asia have the ability to 
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supply seven times the demand of Fair Trade product.322 Oversupply is positive in that 
companies have choice for sourcing certified products, but is negative in that oversupply will 
generally reduce the price that may be charged for certified products, lessening the incentive 
for the scheme to be adopted.323 It is possible, however, that this "relatively persistent 
condition of oversupply" is a sign of the global markets adjusting to the rapid growth in 
certified products and the markets are "undergoing a transformation toward compliance with 
voluntary sustainability standards".324  
 
A risk that NGOs should be wary of is that in utilising market mechanisms to pursue their 
values, there is a risk that they may be captured by market principles.325 That is, it is 
important to focus on the ends without being caught up in the means. Both the Forest 
Stewardship Council and the Fair Trade system have struggled to manage the schemes' 
market strategies while maintaining their underlying goals. This stems from the inherent 
contradiction in certification schemes: they cannot isolate themselves from mainstream 
markets and the strategies that come with them, but nor can they abandon the schemes' non-
market values.326 Initially, growth in the "ethical" markets were led by early adopting firms 
and consumers.327 As schemes grew, and consumers became more aware, schemes have 
tended to adopt a "mainstreaming" strategy, whereby larger actors are encouraged to support 
the schemes, resulting in rapid growth in the schemes' market share and a broader customer 
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base.328  While mainstream adoption of the schemes is positive for widespread change, there 
are some dangers. First, as mentioned in Part IV, to communicate with mainstream 
consumers, the message of these schemes may be simplified and diluted, which has arguably 
occurred with Fair Trade. A rather dramatic articulation of the problem, referring specifically 
to Fair Trade, said the organisers are facing the choice between "continuing to be pure (and 
marginal) or aligning with large distribution (and losing their soul)".329 In addition, there is 
more at stake than ideology, for mainstreaming usually means there are larger organisations 
in the schemes' respective supply chains.330 This opens schemes up to the risk of being 
beholden to the purchasing power of the large corporations.331 This issue is connected to the 
problem of oversupply, as it lies in the rapid expansion of the certified product market. 
Consequently, while the schemes' growth is positive for the success of certification schemes, 
rapid growth contains risks that must be managed carefully.  
 
C Incomplete coverage: twin problems 
One of the issues with the international regulatory environment identified earlier was that 
regulation was fragmented, lacking a coordinating power. Certification schemes do not 
address this issue, and may even exacerbate it. The problem is that there are both too many 
and too few schemes: there are multiple overlapping schemes in some issue-areas and gaps in 
coverage elsewhere. The schemes are spontaneously created and their evolution is 
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decentralised.332 The result is a "patchwork of uncoordinated schemes competing vigorously 
for adherents, resources, legitimacy and public notice."333   
 
1. Too many schemes 
The lack of coordinating power and the relatively low cost of schemes, among other factors, 
has led to a proliferation of different schemes, established and managed by different actors 
yet addressing similar issues.334 For example, just in the area of forestry certification 
schemes, there are over fifty competing initiatives.335 This leads to firms being able to do the 
certification scheme equivalent of jurisdiction shopping, picking the less stringent, often 
industry-led schemes.336 Furthermore, because there are so many different schemes, it is 
difficult to communicate to consumers what the more effective ones are, and thus the less 
strict schemes are able to exploit the general goodwill associated with a certification 
schemes, while weakening the credibility of the responsible consumption movement.337 A 
comprehensive study of the certification scheme market found that newer, mainstream-
orientated schemes have standards with less depth and breadth, which enables faster uptake 
of the standards, but reduced effects.338 Moreover, having many schemes that cover the same 
issue-areas raises questions of efficiency and appropriate use of resources.  Overlapping 
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schemes may provide some benefits, such as competition and innovation, but their negative 
effects outweigh the positive.339 
 
2. Too few schemes 
Second, there are many gaps in the coverage of schemes. There is no coordinating power, so 
attention to issues is reliant on the many different NGOs or other actors identifying areas of 
concern. As a result, schemes are ad hoc and there is arbitrary discrimination of policy areas. 
For example while there is a well-established and robust certification scheme for conflict-free 
diamonds, the one for conflict-free gold is weak, and industry-run.340   Naturally, some 
problems will be more difficult to address via certification schemes, or completely 
unfeasible, requiring a different type of regulatory tool. It is unknown how far the schemes in 
existence can be generalised.341 As illustrated in this paper, even initiatives that could be 
considered successes, such as the Forest Stewardship Council, Fair Trade and the Kimberly 
Process continue to face issues that threaten the schemes' abilities to achieve their goals. 
Attempting to create schemes in less conducive conditions is likely to be extremely difficult. 
However, this could be mitigated by using the existing schemes as institutional models: the 
Forest Stewardship Council for example was a model for the Marine Stewardship Council.342 
Furthermore, the potential for regulatory standard-setting to be successful in different 
contexts should not be underestimated. A commentator in 2009 noted that the Kimberly 
Process would be unlikely to be successfully repeated with other goods that were linked to 
conflict because "consumers buy cellphones, not coltan".343 However, the raising the issue of 
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conflict diamonds has been the catalyst for concern with other "conflict resources".344 There 
is currently a "fairphone" on the market that aims to use conflict-free materials,345 and Intel 
has committed to a conflict-free supply chain, paring with NGO The Enough Project.346 
These initiatives show that the industries disagree, and consider there to be a market for 
conflict free products generally, including coltan. To conclude, while the different schemes 
are patchy and are unlikely to transform their markets into institutions where broader social 
values are at the center of production, trade and consumption decisions,347 they are beginning 
to connect, and could in time achieve more complete coverage:348 
… all these hybrid forms of governance are beginning to overlap and occupy the same global 'space'… 
global voluntary regulatory programs in which business plays a critical role have grown in number and 
size in the last few years. … they are beginning to connect and overlap in ways that may strengthen 
them. It may be that we cannot and should not evaluate each of them in isolation, but consider the 
totality of new forms of governance and their larger impact on relations between citizens, governments, 
and markets. (citations omitted) 
3. Potential Solutions 
Undoubtedly there are many ways to accelerate certification schemes' global cohesion.   Two 
options are collaboration between different schemes and orchestration by international 
governmental organisations. The case for collaboration between the three main actors in 
international regulation is made earlier in this paper, but in terms of addressing scheme 
fragmentation, collaboration between different schemes with similar goals may ameliorate 
the problem.349 They can continue to operate independently, but collaborate on procedures 
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and standards, facilitating the evening-out of standards to "reduce the confusion of multiple 
schemes" and help "establish shared practices as international standards, undercutting the 
legitimacy of less stringent schemes".350 Such cooperation provides mutual support and 
learning, facilitates harmonization to reduce the burden and confusion of multiple schemes, 
and boosts the influence of the schemes in international forums.351 Fair Trade itself is an 
example of coordination, as the international body is an umbrella agency for different 
national fair trade schemes that were previously independent schemes.352  
 
The second option is for international governmental organisations to take more of a 
coordinating role in non-state regulation.  Abbot and Snidal propose a theory of 
"orchestration" for international standard-setting regulation, which applies to global 
certification schemes. Orchestration involves international organisations "reaching out to 
private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their 
activities".353 The theory is advanced on the argument that international governmental 
organisations have coordinating capabilities that ought to be taken advantage of, to 
coherently utilise the regulatory capabilities of the other actors in the system.354 Abbot and 
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Snidal propose that such organisations have the global reach, representativeness and 
legitimacy to coordinate a successful system of transnational standard-setting.355  
 
Orchestration is only a theory, and as mentioned in Part V, any practical reliance on untested 
theories should be done with caution. There is evidence of the occurrence of orchestration, 
but its effectiveness in practice is questionable.356 Currently, international governmental 
organisations tend to resist combining standards. For example, many United Nations agencies 
only endorse the UN Global Compact scheme, even though it is not necessarily the most 
effective.357 United Nations Environment Programme has been fairly aggressive in seeking 
possibilities for standard-setting orchestration, but other international governmental 
organisations have been less enthusiastic, or even in the case of the International Labour 
Organisation, surprisingly hostile.358 The organisations' particular bureaucratic structure and 
culture will have an impact on its willingness to play a role in coordinating groups of 
certification schemes.359   
 
An additional qualification is that the certification bodies themselves may not be willing to 
cooperate. The plethora of different schemes are evidence of different, and sometimes 
conflicting, perspectives on the standards that should be implemented held by different 
NGOs, corporations and international governmental organisations.360 However, non-state 
actors are often more willing to work with international governmental organisations than 
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state are, as the issue of sovereignty is not present.361 NGOs may see international 
governmental organisations as allies because often the two actors have parallel goals.362 In 
terms of other non-state actors, firms are likely to prefer coordinated regulation through 
international government organisations than uncoordinated regulation by many states and 
external pressure from NGOs.363 Abbot and Snidal detail many practical ways that a 
motivated international government organisation may take steps to orchestrate,364 and in 
doing so, mitigate some of the weaknesses in the decentralised standard-setting network.365 
There are likely to be barriers to effective orchestration, but if successful it could 
significantly increase the regulatory value of certification schemes by facilitating more 
coherent application.  
 
IX  Conclusion 
To conclude, the emergence of NGOs as international regulatory actors is part of a trend 
towards collaborative network regulation, and is an example of the value in exploiting the 
different regulatory capacities of different actor groups. Certification schemes are an example 
of NGOs' regulatory abilities, and also a symptom of the blurring between public and private 
regulation. Certification schemes harness market mechanisms to change behaviour, and in 
doing so can be more effective than an international regulation without coercive sanctions. 
The effectiveness of such schemes is difficult to assess and can be contentious. In using 
market forces, the schemes run into problems with effective marketing and with managing 
supply and demand. The extremely decentered aspect of NGO regulation means that there is 
fragmentation across different issue areas. Furthermore, not all NGOs are created equal, and 
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there remain issues around accountability and effectiveness that need to be considered. Thus 
there is potential for positive contribution by NGOs to international regulation, particularly in 
their use of certification schemes, but these risks need to be managed. Finally, certification 
schemes should be embraced, for "all the schemes that have emerged are not optimal, and all 
the optimal schemes have not emerged".366  
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